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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
VOL. XXII

WINTER 1970

NO. 3

THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE: CONSUMER'S
CODE-

OR LENDER'S CODE?
LYNN

M. LoPUCKI*

In 1964 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
announced that it had commenced an exhaustive study of the entire field
of consumer credit for the purpose of drafting uniform legislation. Four years
and ten drafts later the Commissioners promulgated a proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) for adoption by the state legislatures.
The U3C, as it has come to be known, is a comprehensive code that deals
with such diverse problems as maximum rates of interest on sales and loans,
the disclosure and advertising of rates' and limitations on agreements, practices, and remedies in the area of consumer credit. The practices regulated
include the use of negotiable paper in consumer sales (which is prohibited),
home solicitation sales (the buyer is given a three-day "cooling off" period
during which he can withdraw from the transaction), and garnishment of
wages and salaries (the Code sets a maximum on the portion subject to
garnishment). In addition, the Act establishes an administrator to whom
2
broad powers of enforcement are granted.
While the prominence of its authors alone would have guaranteed the
Code serious consideration by the legislatures, an additional pressure has
added to the likelihood of adoption. In 1967, while work on the Consumer
Credit Code was in progress, Congress approved the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act (Truth in Lending). The major provisions of the Federal Act
were designed to guarantee full disclosure of interest rates on a simple per
annum basis in consumer credit transactions. The Act provided for federal
enforcement. But the Act further provided that the Federal Reserve Board
3
could, by regulation, exempt from coverage:
[A]ny class of credit transactions within any State if it determines
that under the law of that State that class of transactions is subject
to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this part,
and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.

*B.A. 1965, J.D. 1967, University of Michigan; Member of the Bars of Florida and
Michigan; Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Florida.
1. These rate disclosures are largely a duplication of the provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act, Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1633 (Supp. 1969).
2. U.C.C.C. §6-108 (1).
3. Consumer Credit Protection Act §123, 15 U.S.C.A. §1633 (Supp. 1969).
[3351

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1

.336

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA TV REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was prepared with this provision
in mind and presumably its substantive provisions do meet the aforementioned test. 4 As the Commissioners were quick to point out: 5
Only if a State enacts the Uniform Consumer Credit Code .

.

. is there

a likelihood of a Board determination by July 1, 1969, the effective
date of the Federal Truth in Lending Act. . . The time factor alone
will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Federal Reserve Board
to make such a determination by July 1, 1969, with respect to any
other State Truth in Lending Act or Regulations.
As of this writing only two states, Utah6 and Oklahoma 7 have adopted
the Code. Probably the major factor delaying, or perhaps preventing its
adoption throughout the rest of the United States is the considerable amount
of criticism of the Code that has come from consumer organizations, including the Consumer Federation of America, The National Legal Services Program, The Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Protection, The Association of
California Consumers, The Consumers League of New Jersey, and others. 8

One of the most vehement and perhaps the most influential consumer organization to oppose enactment of the Code is Consumer's Union, the publisher of Consumer Reports, which stated in a recent issue:9
It is true that some responsible consumer spokesmen have, despite
misgivings, endorsed the U.C.C.C.... But C.U. and its legal consultants can find little to cheer about. We don't think any state, no
matter how bad its existing credit laws, should adopt the U.C.C.C.
without extensive amendments in favor of consumers.
In far more ways than can be recited here the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code seems dedicated to perpetuating current unhealthy practices. The influence of the credit industry comes through in section
after section.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was introduced in the 1969 Florida
legislature as House Bill 596. Legislative hearings were held in which the
Code was heavily criticized by representatives of both the credit industry and
consumers. Despite early optimism, the Code was not enacted during the
1969 session, and its future is now in doubt. That the Code has not yet been
adopted in Florida is perhaps understandable, but it seems most peculiar
that its defeat should be in the name of consumer protection with consumer
interest groups in the forefront of the opposition. While the effect of adoption
of the U3C in states where consumer protection is relatively advanced, such

4.
to the
5.
6.

See the Federal Reserve Board's Statement, Appendix A to the Prefatory Notes
1969 Revised Final Draft of the U.C.C.C.
Prefatory Notes to the 1969 Revised Final Draft.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§70B-1-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969).
7. OKLAHOMA STAT. ANN. tit. 14a, §§1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969).
8. A number of these position papers are included in CONSUMER

RESEARCH FOUNDATION,

(1969).
Consumer Reports, March 1969, at 121, 122, 126 (emphasis added).

CRITIQUE OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE

9.
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as California or Massachusetts, may be to detract from the present level of
consumer protection, the changes that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
would make in the present law of Florida would be in the direction of greater
consumer protection in nearly every instance.

MODERNIZING THE LAW

As with other uniform legislation, the drafters have billed the U3C as
attempting to "simplify, clarify, modernize, and make uniform the law of the
various jurisdictions."10 Any advantages to be gained from uniformity depend
upon adoption of the Code elsewhere. The first adoptions, rather than
making state laws more uniform, may in fact be detracting from the uniformity already achieved under the Uniform Small Loan Act. However, the
adoption of the Code, perhaps in a form slightly modified by both the
Commissioners and the legislatures, seems inevitable. This prediction is
based upon the fact that most opposition to the Code has been concerned
with the high maximum rates, and amending them downward, as was done
in Oklahoma," is relatively minor surgery.
One of the major contributions that the Code would make to Florida
law would be to simplify and better organize the regulation of consumer
credit. Presently it is regulated under at least five different laws: the Small
Loan Act,1 2 the Discount Consumer Financing Act,1 3 the Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act, the Retail Installment Sales Act,' 4 and the Usury Law. 15
Although the Code in its final form does not differ greatly in length from
these laws, its terms are more explicit and its coverage is broader. In addition, the duplication of substantially similar provisions, which is so common
in the present Florida law, has been considerably reduced. For instance, in
establishing maximum rates of interest the present law specifies a rate of
three per cent per month on the first 300 dollars and two per cent per month
on any amount over 300 dollars for a lender under the Small Loan Act; 16
ten dollars per 100 dollars per year for a seller licensed under the Retail
Installment Sales Act;' 7 six per cent per annum on the total amount of the
loan (not the outstanding balance) where the lender is a bank and the
loan does not exceed 5,000 dollars;28 ten per cent per annum (simple interest)
for a lender under the general usury law;' 9 and finally, for a seller under the

10.
11.
§2-201
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

U.C.C.C. §1-102 (c) (a), (8).
E.g., compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A §2-201 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1969), with U.C.C.C.
(2) (a) (i).
FLA. STAT. ch. 516 (1967.
FLA. STAT. ch.519 (1967).
Both are included in FLA. STAT. ch. 520 (1967).
FLA. STAT. ch.687 (1967).
FLA. STAT. §516.14 (1967).
FLA. STAT. §520.34 (4) (1967).
FLA. STAT. §659.18 (1) (1967).
FiA. STAT. §687.02 (1967).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXII

Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act the law provides a schedule of rates, depending on the age of the car and ranging from eight dollars per 100 dollars
per year to seventeen dollars per 100 dollars per year.2 0 Revolving charge
accounts also carry a maximum rate slightly different from that under the
2 1
Retail Installment Sales Act.

Under the Code the corresponding maximum would be the greater of
(1) thirty-six per cent on the first 300 dollars, twenty-one per cent on the next
700 dollars, and fifteen per cent on everything over 1,000 dollars; or (2) a
flat rate of eighteen per cent on sales or licensed loans, eighteen per cent on
unlicensed loans, and two per cent per month on the first 500 dollars and one
and one-half per cent per month on the remainder for revolving credit.

MAXIMUM

RATES

Together with the easing of licensing and inspection requirements in the
small loan business, these changes in the maximum chargeable rates of
interest are undoubtedly the most controversial changes the Code would
make. The Code's maximum rates have been the subject of particularly
22
heavy criticism. Consumer Reports lamented that:
[T]he part of the U.C.C.C. best calculated to appeal to lenders is its
maximum interest rates . . . George Brunn, a municipal court judge
in Berkeley, California, and a C.U. board member . . . wrote to the

U.C.C.C. sponsors: "To give persons a right to charge 36% - plus
interest (or finance charge) shocks at least my conscience and I do
not believe that I am unduly sensitive."
"Thirty-six per cent plus" may well shock a Californian since the California Small Loan Law limits interest to two and one-half per cent per
months on the first 100 dollars and two per cent per month on the next 200
dollars.23 Florida, however, already permits the "thirty-six per cent plus" rate
on the first 300 dollars under its small loan law.24
The U.C.C.C. maximum rates would exceed top rates now in effect in
such important industrial states as Illinois,2 5 Massachusetts, 2 6 Michigan,27

New Jersey, 2s and New York.2 9 On the other hand, rates higher than three

20.
21.
22.

23.

FLA. STAT. §520.08 (1967).
FLA. STAT. §520.35 (1967).
CONSUMER REPORTS, March 1969, at 122-23.
CAL. FIN. CODE §§24451, 24452 (West 1968).
FLA. STAT. §516.14 (1967).

24.
25. The Illinois maximum is 3% per month, but the rates are scaled down sharply as
the size of the loan increases. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 74, §31 (1963).
26. MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, §100 (1968) (regulatory board to set minimum rate).
27. MICH. STAT. ANN. §23.667 (13) (Supp. 1966) (2.5%).

28. N.J.
29.

STAT. ANN.

§ 17:10-14 (Supp. 1969) (2%).

N.Y. BANKING LAw §352 (McKinney 1968) (2.5%).
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per cent per month are permitted in Alaska, 30 Hawaii, 3' and Louisiana. 32 The
maximum rate in most states seems to be about three per cent per month, 33
which would closely approximate the maximum rate under the U.C.C.C.
In defense of their rates the drafters have stated that their purpose "is
to set ceilings and not to fix rates ....

While this section sets rate ceilings,

several other sections are designed to generate sufficient competition to set
rates."3 4
The Code's detractors simply deny that this would be the effect. Indeed,
the evidence seems to support the statement that: 35
Except in one or two states, finance charges on most short term cash
loans by licensed lenders appear to be at the ceiling rates. Actual
finance charges on used cars are probably at the ceiling more often
than in the case of new cars, although there is no reliable evidence to
support this assertion. Since in both of these particular markets, the
consumer is frequently a marginal credit risk, it is not unreasonable
to hypothesize that the ceilings set the rates. This is not to say that
there is no competition when all the consumer finance companies in
a given state charge the same rate on each size and maturity of loan,
but that it must then center on obtaining customers who qualify for
that rate through various forms of nonprice competition, such as
prompt service and flexible terms.
The Association of California Consumers has put the case more tersely: 36
It is common knowledge, however, that competition never has operated
as an effective check on finance charges in consumer credit transactions
and that it probably will not do so now.
The obvious reply to such statements with regard to Florida law is that
the Code would actually decrease rather than increase the maximum rates
for licensed loans.3y The Code would, however, increase substantially the
maximum rates for other types of loans, notably bank loans, credit union
loans, and revolving credit.38 But rates in these areas of consumer credit are
most likely to be competitive since generally the more sophisticated borrowers

30.
31.

ALASKA STAT.

§06.20.230 (1962) (4%).

HAwAII REv. STAT. §409-16 (1968) (3.5%).
32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §6.583 (1951) (3.5%).
33. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDrr LEGISLATION 158-66 (1965).
34. U.C.C.C. §2-201, Comment 1.
35. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH.

L. REv. 81, 92-93 (1967).
36. Revised Statement of the Association of California Consumers before the Assembly
Committee on Judiciary of the California State Legislature Hearings on Consumer Problems,
San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 11, 1968, reproduced in CRIrIQUE OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE, CONSUMER RESEARcH FOUNDATION, BERKELEY, CAL.

87.
of the
month,
38.

264 (1969).

Florida permits a 3% charge on the first $300, which is substantially the equivalent
Code's 36% on the first $300, but on the second $300 Florida permits 2% per
the Code 21% per year.
Banks are presently permitted to charge slightly less than 12%, credit unions 12%,
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qualify for these types of loans. Statistics that show that maximum rates
become the norm rarely deal with these types of credit. Moreover, the
Code does not rely completely on presently available factors; a number
of other changes are expected to increase the probability of competition in
consumer credit. Among them are disclosure of true annual interest rates and
freedom of entry into the lending business.
Disclosure of Annual Rates
Under present practices, interest rates on consumer loans or sales are
rarely stated as a per cent per year on the outstanding balance. More
frequently they are stated as a per cent per month or as X number of dollars
per 100 dollars per year of the amount outstanding at the beginning of the
year.39 Perhaps most deceptively, interest is stated at a specified annual rate
on the original balance of the loan, not on the outstanding balance. In this
situation, payment in installments will result in a true rate that is about
double the stated rate. Those who favor continuation of the present practices
argue that, while they may have been deceptive originally, consumers have
come to think in terms of monthly rates, add-ons, and calculations based on
the original balance; and consequently, it is the annual rate on the outstanding balance that would appear deceptively high. Proponents of a change
in these practices point out that in the case of interest on savings accounts,
and in other situations where the consumer is on the receiving end of the
interest charge, rates are uniformly stated as a per cent per year on the outstanding balance.
In all regulated lending Florida law requires a disclosure of the rate to be
charged. However, the law not only permits a lender to state the rate by the
methods outlined above but actually encourages it, since the maximum
chargeable rates themselves are stated in these allegedly deceptive terms.
The Small Loan Law states a maximum charge of three per cent per month, 40
the Retail Installment Sales Act states the maximum rate as ten dollars per
100 dollars per year,4 1 and the Banking Code allows banks to charge six per
cent per annum on the total amount of the loan, not the outstanding balance.

42

With rates stated in such various manners it is not at all surprising that
there is so little price competition in the credit market. Suppose a small
loan company does charge a lower rate, how is its customer to know if he
does not take his interest tables with him when he goes shopping for credit?

and revolving credit slightly more than 20%. Under the U.C.C.C., banks and credit unions
would be permitted 18% and 24% respectively; revolving credit would be 2% on the first
$500 and 1.5% per month on the next $500.
39. Since this type of loan will probably be paid back in monthly installments the
true annual rate will be a percentage that is about double the stated amount of dollars.
40. FLA. STAT. §516.14 (1967).

41.
42.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§520.34 (4) (1967).
§659.18 (1) (1967).
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On July 1, 1969, the disclosure requirements of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act became effective. This law requires that regardless of
the manner in which finance charges are calculated they must be stated to
43
the borrower as an annual rate on the outstanding balance. Although the
elimination of the rate disclosure barrier does not guarantee that there will
be price competition in the credit market, it does make it more likely. In
discussing whether an increase in actual rates can be avoided through increased price disclosure requirements, it should be remembered that Florida
faces a threatened increase in bank and credit union rates, not small loan
rates. Rate disclosure may not be sufficient to enable small loan borrowers to
shop for credit, but generally a person who can qualify for credit at bank rates
(whether twelve or eighteen per cent) would have enough sophistication to
make the rational decision necessary to the functioning of the market. Even
without disclosure of annual rates there is evidence of some price competition
in the bank loan market. Florida banks generally lend money at two, and
sometimes as many as five, different rates depending upon the credit worthiness of the borrower.
Freedom of Entry
A second change in present law that is designed to promote the competitive functioning of the consumer credit market is freedom of entry. Before
granting a license under the Small Loan Act or the Consumer Discount Financing Act, Florida law requires not only positive findings as to the character, fitness, and financial responsibility of the applicant, but also a finding
that granting the license will promote the "convenience and advantage of
the community." This latter phrase has generally been interpreted to mean
that if there are already enough lenders in operation to serve the community's
needs, no further licenses will be granted. The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code would abandon this requirement and rely upon competition to keep
the number of lenders at an appropriate level. Whether the market will in
fact accomplish this result has been questioned by some writers,44 but judged
by the states presently operating without any requirement of convenience

43. The Act defines the annual percentage rate in 15 U.S.C.A. §1606 (a) (1) (A) as being:
"(A) that nominal annual percentage rate which will yield a sum equal to the amount of
the finance charge when it is applied to the unpaid balances of the amount financed, calculated according to the actuarial method of allocating payments made on a debt between
the amount financed and the amount of the finance charge, pursuant to which a payment is
applied first to the accumulated finance charge and the balance is applied to the unpaid
amount financed; or (B) the rate determined by any method prescribed by the Board as
a method which materially simplifies computation while retaining reasonable accuracy as
compared with the rate determined under subparagraph (A)."
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code §2-304 (2) adopts an almost identical definition.
44. F. HUBAcHECK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAws 53-58 (1938); Conference on Personal Finance Law, Convenience and Advantage Clause (1946); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus. L. 227 (1968); Sullivan, Administration
of a Regulatory Small Loan Law, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 146 (1941).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

and advantage45 the results of free entry are unlikely to be disastrous to the
lending institutions.
Some additional changes related to freedom of entry have met with more
strenuous objection. Licenses would not be required for persons lending at
rates of eighteen per cent or less, and the rather heavy fees for licenses to
lend at rates in excess of eighteen per cent would be eliminated. 46 The Code
provides instead that funds for operation of the office of the administrator
are to be derived from general appropriations.47 In addition, not only does
the approach of the Code to examination of licensees represent an apparent
easing of the burden upon them,4s but periodic examination of regulated
lenders is not required. Objection to these changes has come from the Florida
Banker's Association, which, in its "Memorandum of Objections" to the Code,
points out that the freedom from licensing and periodic examination for
lenders at rates under eighteen per cent per year would not apply to banks.
They would continue to be regulated by the Banking Code, which has strict
licensing and examination requirements. This would put banks at a comparative disadvantage in the consumer credit market. Whether this disadvantage
will have any effect upon consumers will depend upon the examination
policy adopted by the administrator in his broad discretion.
With regard to the other changes that the Code would make in the law
regulating consumer credit practices, there can be no question that the law
would move toward greater consumer protection. However, there are doubts
as to the efficacy or importance of particular changes. A number of what
appear to be the most important changes are discussed in the remainder of
this article.
COOLING OFF PERIOD

One consumer problem that has succeeded in attracting substantial publicity is high-pressure selling by door-to-door salesmen, especially those dealing in home improvements. This problem is particularly difficult to deal with
because of the wide varieties of techniques employed and the fear of disrupting legitimate commerce through the use of broad prohibitions. In 1964
England adopted a statute giving consumers who made installment purchases in their own homes seventy-two hours to withdraw from the transaction, a so-called "cooling off period."49 Similar statutes were enacted in two
45. E.g., ARIZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§6-608 to -610 (1956); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. §73-2-(2)
(1963); D.C. CODE ANN. §26-602 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §18-3001 (1964). At least ten other
states presently do not require a finding of convenience and advantage for issuance of a
small loan license.
46. FLA. STAT. §516.03 (1) (1967) requires the payment of a $100 fee for processing an
application for a small loan license and in addition a $100 per year license fee.
47. U.C.C.C. §3-502, Comment 3.
48. Under present law each licensee must undergo at least two examinations per year.
Depending on the amount of loans outstanding, the fee for each examination will range
from $30 to $100, FLA. STAT. §516.11 (2) (1967). Under the Code the administrator would
be free to set the interval at which periodic examinations would be conducted and no fees
are suggested. U.C.C.C. §3-506.
49. Hire-Purchase Act of 1965, c. 66, §11 (1).
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Australian states 50 and five Canadian provinces. 51 In the United States feelings
about high-pressure home solicitation sales first came to a boil over the home
improvement racket. Fly-by-night operators would promise the improvements
and obtain the buyer's signature to a negotiable contract. The contract was
then quickly negotiated to a holder in due course, and the sellers disappeared
leaving their hapless customer to pay off the bank or finance company.
Statutes providing for a cooling off period in home improvement contracts
were enacted in both Michigan and Pennsylvania in 1965,52 partly as a reaction to the fraud described above and partly because of a feeling that consumers should have an opportunity to reconsider without the salesman
present.
In 1966 Massachusetts enacted a one-day cooling off period for "retail
installment contracts consummated at other than the seller's place of business." 53 Since then, general cooling off periods have been enacted in eight
more states54 and have been considered by the legislatures in a number of
others. Florida presently has no cooling off period.
The Federal Truth in Lending Act provides for a three-day cooling off
period in any consumer credit transaction in which a security interest in the
borrower's residence is acquired. The section does not apply to "a first lien
against a dwelling to finance the acquisition of that dwelling."55 While the
Federal Act deals with the most troublesome kinds of home solicitation sales,
it does not reach the heart of the problem. Schemes such as the one described
above would continue to be effective so long as the sellers did not seek the
security of a mortgage. The taking of negotiable contracts and the ability
of the seller to employ high-pressure methods to convince the buyer to sign
against his better judgment make this questionable business profitable.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code makes an attempt to deal with both
of these techniques. It incorporates the federal provision 56 and a three-day
cooling off period for all home solicitation contracts. Until midnight of the
third business day after the contract is signed, a purchaser may cancel a
consumer credit sale solicited at his residence if for any reason he does not

50. The Door to Door [Sales] Act 1963, Vict. No. 7091 (Austl.);
Act 1964, STAT. W. AUSTL. No. 107.
51. The Direct Sales Cancellation Act, STAT. ALBERTA c. 28 (1966);
Act, STAT. BRIT. CoLUm. c. 14, §§3-10 (1967); The Consumers' Credit
c. 15, §§6-11 (1965), as amended, STAT. MANITOBA C. 11 (1966); The

Door to Door [Sales]
Consumer Protection
Act, STAT. MANITOBA
Direct Sellers Act of

1966, STAT. NEWF. No. 85, §23; The Direct Sellers Act, REV. STAT. SASK. c. 331, §20 (1965).
52. MICH. STAT. ANN. §19.417-202 (c) (4) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §500-

202 (c) (4) (Supp. 1969).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255 D, §14A (1968).
54. Home Solicitation Sales Act, Pub. Act No. 749, §2 (a) [1967], CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§42-137 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. §476-3 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%,
§262B (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Door to Door Retail Installment Sales Act of 1968, NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§17:16C-61.1 to -61.9 (Supp. 1969); Home Solicitation Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§6-28-1 to -8 (Special Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §2454 (Supp. 1969); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §63.14.154 (Supp. 1969).
55. Consumer Credit Protection Act §125, 15 U.S.C.A. §1635 (Supp. 1969).
56. U.C.C.C. §5-204.
53.
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want to go through with the transaction.57 The Code provides that when the
contract is made the buyer is to be notified in writing of his right to cancel.
After cancellation the seller may retain the lesser of the cash downpayment
or five per cent of the cash price. Upon cancellation the seller has ten days
to return any payments made and forty days to pick up the goods at the
buyer's home. If the seller fails to retrieve the goods within this time period
they become the property of the buyer and he need not pay for them. These
provisions give the home solicitation buyer a fair opportunity to examine
the bargain he has made without outside pressure. But they deal only indirectly with the problem of negotiable contracts, since often the buyer will
not be aware of his problem until some time after the negotiable contract
is made.
HOLDER IN

DUE

COURSE AND WAIVER OF DEFENSES

The use of negotiable paper in order to separate an obligation to pay
from the contract out of which it arises is a time-honored and accepted business practice. But in transactions where the buyer is a consumer, the use of
negotiable paper has come into serious question. Typically the transfer of
the instrument is made by prearrangement to a finance company, bank, or
acceptance corporation in the business of buying such paper. The usual
arrangement is for the purchaser to buy all of a seller's paper. In addition,
the purchaser frequently is merely a separately incorporated adjunct of the
seller's business, set up to allow the seller to obtain indirectly the status
of holder in due course. In a decision of national significance the Supreme
Court of Florida ruled s that if the relationship between the seller and the
purchaser of the paper were too close, the purchaser would be denied the
status of holder in due course.5 9 But from the standpoint of the consumer
this made little difference since, if the negotiable contract were sold to an
outsider, perhaps a bank or finance company, that entity could still become
a holder in due course.
Nationally there has been a substantial amount of agitation and some success in the direction of eliminating the concept of holder in due course from
consumer financing.60 In the wake of newspaper articles and consumer complaints concerning the use of negotiable installment contracts in fraudulent
home improvement schemes and other consumer credit rackets, an attempt
was made to bar the doctrine of holder in due course from a large proportion of consumer credit transactions during the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 61 However, the provision was deleted in a later drafting.
57. U.C.C.C. §§2-501 to -505.
58. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
59. See also Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
60. See, e.g., Comment, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 285 (1968).
61. The spring 1950 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, §9-209(3), reads: "In
the case of a seller's purchase money security interest in consumer goods an agreement not
to assert claims and defenses arising out of the sales contract against an assignee is not
effective and a note given as part of such a transaction is subject to such claims or defenses
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Since then, Massachusetts and Maryland have substantially eliminated the
holder in due course doctrine from consumer credit sales. 62
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code takes a strong stand against the
use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit sales. The Code prohibits
the taking of a negotiable instrument other than a check in a consumer
credit sale. 63 If a seller takes a negotiable instrument in violation of the
Code provision, the buyer need not pay any interest and may recover from the
seller a penalty to be determined by the court, not to exceed three times the
finance charge on the transaction.- 4 If the violation is willful it may carry
an additional penalty in an action by the Administrator.-5 It is recognized,
however, that some negotiable instruments will be taken in violation of this
provision; if such an instrument ends up in the hands of a holder in due
course, the debtor must pay the instrument and cannot assert his defenses.
However, under the Code, a person who buys a negotiable instrument would
not be a holder in due course if he knew the instrument arose out of a
a consumer credit transaction.66
Although the drafter of the Code would appear to have dealt firmly with
the emotion-laden issue of negotiable instruments in consumer credit sales,
the Code may not dramatically improve the position of consumers whose new
refrigerators do not work. Even though sellers do not take negotiable instruments, essentially the same effect can be achieved in two different ways.
The same legal effect can be achieved by a waiver of defenses. In such a
case the contract (nonnegotiable, but assignable) provides that the debtor
agrees he will not assert against the seller's assignee any defenses he may
have against the assignor. The drafters of the Code provided two alternative
sections to deal with this problem. 7 Alternative A would make any waiver of
defenses in a consumer credit sale ineffective. But alternative B would make
the waiver ineffective only with respect to defects that the buyer complains
of in the first three months after notice of the assignment. If alternative B
were adopted, undoubtedly many of the sellers who presently take negotiable
instruments would switch to the use of waiver of defenses. A critical factor
in evaluating the importance of this "loophole" would be the number of
cases in which buyers do not discover and complain of defects within the
three-month period.
The same practical effect as sellers taking negotiable instruments can be
achieved if sellers simply refuse to extend credit, since the buyer will then
presumably borrow elsewhere and probably sign a negotiable instrument.8
Certainly, sellers who cannot take negotiable instruments will be at a comparative disadvantage in competition with lenders who can. Some increase
even though in the hands of a holder in due course."
62. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 83, §147 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255, §12C (1968).

63. U.C.C.C. §2-403.
64. U.C.C.C. §5-202 (1).
65. U.C.C.C. §6-113 (2).
66. U.C.C.C. §2-403.
67. U.C.C.C. §2-404.
68. The Code does not prohibit a lender taking a negotiable instrument.
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in the proportion of loans granted by lenders as opposed to sellers can be
expected, but the critical question is how great an increase. Since the convenience of seller credit would in the vast majority of cases outweigh the additional cost, the shift would probably not be massive. But an important
factor is how to make lender credit convenient. Can a large department
store, for instance, invite an "independent" lender onto the premises and
let its clerks sign up customers for loans? Although the Code is silent as to
how cozy a seller and lender may become, the Martin"9 and Unico0 ° cases may
provide some guidelines. Although it is hardly reasonable to suppose that
substantially all sellers are going to quit making installment sales, the very
fact that the use of negotiable instruments will be made substantially more
inconvenient is bound to yield substantial benefits to consumers.
GARNISHMENT OF WAGES

Garnishment is the procedure by which a creditor who is unable to collect money due him is able, through a court order, to collect the money from
a third party who owes money to the debtor. The process becomes controversial when the third party from whom collection is made is the debtor's employer and the debt garnished is salary or wages. The concern is twofold:
the garnishment may leave the debtor without the means to support himself
or his family; and second, it seems to be a well-known (although not very
well-documented) fact that many employers follow a policy of discharging
employees against whom writs of garnishment are issued.71 Whatever the
specific effect, some indication of the powerful over-all effect that garnishment has on debtors is given by the high correlation between rates of voluntary bankruptcies and the protections afforded debtors under the states'
2
wage garnishment laws.7

Florida's garnishment laws are, at best, uneven in the protection that they
afford to debtors. On the one hand, Florida law provides that all wages or
salary of a head of a household are entirely exempt from garnishment;7 3 this
statutory generosity is matched in only two other states.7 4 On the other hand,
however, no exemption is provided for the earnings of one not the head of
a household. Florida's garnishment procedures are cumbersome enough to

69.

Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953). See text accompanying note

58 supra.
70.
71.

Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
For an attempt at documenting the relationship between garnishment and firing, see
Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California, A Study and Recommendations, 53 CAL. L. REV.
1214, 1229-33 (1965); Satter, Argument for Abolition of Wage Attachment, 52 ILL. B.J. 1026,

1034-35 (1964).
72. Brunn, supra note 71, at 1234-38; Satter, Wage Assignments and Garnishments Cited
as a Major Cause of Bankruptcy in Illinois, 15 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 50 (1961); U.S.
Bureau of Labor Standards, DEP'T OF LABOR, DEBT POOLINC
TO CONSUMER INDEBTEDNESS 4 (fact sheet ser. No. 4-F 1966).
73. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1967).

74.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

42, §886 (1966);

TEXAS
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render garnishment a relatively ineffective means of directly enforcing collections, 75 but unfortunately the remedy can usually accomplish its effect in
terrorem. The position of a debtor not the head of a household is further
eroded by the fact that in Florida garnishment of wages under certain
circumstances is available before judgment.76 In these cases the debtor must
face the prospect of losing his job before he has even had the opportunity
to litigate the validity of the creditor's claim.
The Federal Truth in Lending Act prohibits the discharge of an employee
because his wages have been garnisheed for a single indebtedness, and provides for a fine of 1,000 dollars or imprisonment for not more than one year
for violators7 2 In addition, it limits the portion of disposable earnings that
may be garnisheed to the lesser of twenty-five per cent or the amount by
which the individual's income exceeds thirty times the federal minimum
wage.78 These provisions become effective July 1, 1970.79
The Code's provisions on garnishment are similar to the congressional
provisions but offer the debtor an additional measure of protection. The
exemption is increased to the lesser of twenty-five per cent of disposable
earnings or the amount by which his disposable earnings exceed forty times
the federal minimum wage.80 Discharge from employment is prohibited for
any garnishments arising out of a consumer credit sale or loan.8, The Code
also prohibits garnishment before judgment where the debt arises out of a
consumer credit sale.8 2 None of these Code provisions would in any way detract from the protection afforded consumers under the federal8 3 or Florida
law.84 Since the Code makes no changes in garnishment procedure, enforcing
a judgment through garnishment of wages will be as difficult after adoption of
the Code as it is presently. The 100 per cent exemption for a head of a
household would also remain in effect.
A problem closely related to garnishment is that of assignment of wages.
A creditor who cannot garnish wages can accomplish the same result by
taking an assignment of wages at the time the loan is made. Thus, meaningful
protection against garnishment must include protection against assignment of

75. Garnishment in Florida can only be had against a debt that is not contingent.
West Fla. Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917). Presumably
a writ could not cover wages unaccrued at the time of the answer; thus possibly necessitating a series of proceedings to satisfy a single obligation.
76. FLA. STAT. §77.031 (1967).
77. Consumer Credit Protection Act §304, 15 U.S.C.A. §1674 (Supp. IV, 1968).
78. Consumer Credit Protection Act §303 (a), 15 U.S.C.A. §1673 (a) (Supp. IV, 1968).
79. Consumer Credit Protection Act §504, 15 U.S.C.A. §1631 n.l (Supp. IV, 1968).
80. U.C.C.C. §5-105.
81. U.C.C.C. §5-106.
82. U.C.C.C. §5-104.
83. See Consumer Credit Protection Act §§305, 307, 15 U.S.C.A. §§1675, 1677 (Supp.

IV, 1968).
84. Comment 5 to U.C.C.C. §5.105 provides: "This section [dealing with exemptions]
is not meant to displace other provisions of state -law which may provide additional
protection to the debtor." The example makes clear that this statement applies to exemptions at a rate higher than the Code rate.
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While current Florida law permits assignment of wages or salary, s

under the Code neither a lender 6 nor a seller 8 7 can take an assignment of
earnings.
OTHER PRACTICES

In a number of states a borrower commonly agrees at the time a loan is
made that the lender may confess judgment against him in case of any later
dispute. If the authorization is employed, the debtor does not receive notice
of the lawsuit. Subsequently, unless he can later reopen the judgment, he
loses his chance to defend. Although the practice of taking and using confessions of judgment is prevalent in a number of states, particularly Pennsulvania, Ohio, and Illinois, they are seldom if ever employed in others.88 Florida
prohibits confessions of judgment,"9 as does the Code. 90
Florida lenders do, however, frequently extract from borrowers a promise
to pay the lender's attorney fees should any difficulty arise in collection.
Florida law restricts the practice with regard to installment sellers in that
the fee cannot be collected unless the case is referred to an attorney not a
salaried employee of the installment seller.91 The charging of such a fee can
of course be a serious deterrent to a borrower who is somewhat in doubt as
to his rights under the agreement. The Code provides two alternative sections
on attorneys' fees. Alternative A 92 would prohibit and make unenforceable
any agreement to pay the attorney's fees of the lender or seller. Alternative B
would limit such a charge to not more than fifteen per cent of the unpaid
debt after default, except in the case of a supervised loan of 1,000 dollars or
less where no charge would be permitted. 3 Even under alternative B the
Code would retain the requirement that the case be referred for collection to
94
an attorney who is "not a salaried employee" of the seller or lender.
Under present Florida law a debtor who has his property repossessed upon
default must still face the prospect of paying the difference between the
amount due and the amount netted upon resale, that is, a "deficiency judgment." 9 5 The Code would prohibit the granting of a deficiency judgment to

a seller where the original purchase price of the repossessed goods was 1,000
dollars or less. 96

85.

FLA. STAT.

§519.11 (1967).

86. U.C.C.C. §3-403.
87. U.C.C.C. §2-410.
88. Some interesting survey data on the use of confessions of judgment clauses can be
found in Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 111 (1961).
89. FLA. STAT. § §55.05, 516.16 (1967).
90. U.C.C.C. §3-407.
91. FLA. STAT. § §520.37, .05 (5) (1967).
92. U.C.C.C. 2.413 with respect to sales, §3-404 with respect to loans.
93. U.C.C.C. §3-514 (1).
94.
95.

U.C.C.C. §2-413 alternative B; §3-404 alternative B.
FLA. STAT. §679.9-504 (2) (1967).

96. U.C.C.C. §5-103 (1) (2).
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One of the problems in allowing a higher interest rate on smaller loans
is that lenders may make a number of small loans to a borrower rather than
one large one in order to obtain a higher finance charge than the lawmaker intended. Florida law prohibits the splitting or dividing of a loan to
obtain a higher rate of charge.97 The Code provides the same protection
against this and similar practices by providing that a seller 9s or a supervised
lender 99 may not use multiple agreements to obtain a higher rate of charge.
The phrasing with regard to lenders is substantially the same as the present
law.
Finally, present Florida law provides only weak disclosure requirements 0 0
to protect a consumer against "balloon payments," the practice of scheduling
"invitingly small installment payments until the end of the contract when
the buyer is confronted with a balloon payment too large to pay."''1 Under
the Code a payment could be "more than twice as large as the average of
earlier scheduled payments" only if the "schedule is adjusted to the seasonal
buyer
or irregular income of the buyer,' 1 2 or if the seller is willing to let 10the
3
loan.
or
sale
original
the
than
terms
favorable
less
no
refinance on
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Whether the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code represents an advance in consumer credit legislation depends upon one's criteria. But if the
relevant criteria is, as many lawmakers seem to believe, the degree of protection and advantage afforded consumers, there can be little doubt that
the Code compares favorably with present Florida law. The provisions of the
Code would increase the maximum chargeable rate of interest to a significant
degree only in the case of bank, credit union, and revolving credit sales or
loans where market forces already seem to operate reasonably well. To improve competition in all areas of the market, the Code would ease restrictions
upon entry into the lending business and further implement the disclosure
requirements of the Federal Truth in Lending Act. While this may have an
adverse effect on banks there is little reason to assume that consumers will
be hurt.
Although the advantages of increased competition may be somewhat speculative, the Code's regulation of certain questionable business practices provides
greater substance. The provisions as to the assignment of wages and limitations on garnishment add needed protection to the consumer's future earnings
and increase the security of his employment situation. Other protections such
as those against deficiency judgments, home solicitations, payment of lenders'

97. FLA. STAT. §516.14 (3) (1967).
98. U.C.C.C. §2-402.
99. U.C.C.C. §3-509.
100. FLA. STAT. §520.34 (2) (1967).
101. U.C.C.C. Comment to §2-405.
102. U.C.C.C. §2-405 applies to sellers; the corresponding section for lenders is §3-402.
103. U.C.C.C. §§2-405, 3-402.
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attorneys' fees, and balloon payments also extend the level of consumer protection. The fact that some of the protection may be partly illusory, as in
the case of the prohibition against the use of negotiable instruments, is unfortunate. Even though the Code may ignore or deal ineffectively with a
number of consumer problems, the change that the Code would make, with
the exception of maximum interest rates for certain kinds of lenders and
possibly the easing of examination requirements for licensees, would increase
consumer protection without limiting current Florida protection.
It would be unfortunate if Florida's lawmakers were to confuse the issue
of the Code's adoption throughout the rest of the United States with the
issue of its adoption here. Whether or not the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code is finally adopted in Florida, its consideration has drawn attention to
the fact that the level of consumer protection in Florida is inadequate and
compares unfavorably with that in other states.
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